The standard way to establish the scientific credentials of a medical treatment is to show that it is more effective than a placebo. With pharmaceuticals, it is relatively easy to make a suitable placebo, but with acupuncture things are not so straightforward. A variety of placebos have been used in acupuncture trials. This paper examines the implications of the choice of placebo for (1) proper blinding, and (2) the nature of the hypothesis being tested in any given trial.
Introduction
The standard way to establish the scientific credentials of a medical treatment is to show that it is more effective than a placebo. This is done by carrying out a randomized controlled trial (RCT), in which participants are randomly allocated to receive either the experimental treatment or a placebo. The purpose of the placebo group is to account for the placebo effect, that is, therapeutic benefits caused by the belief that one is receiving an effective treatment rather than from the inherent properties of the experimental treatment. Without a placebo control group, it is not possible to know whether any therapeutic effects are due to the experimental treatment itself rather than to the patient's belief in that treatment.
Evidence for the placebo effect
Placebo control groups would be unnecessary if beliefs had no therapeutic effect. So what is the evidence for such belief effects? The answer to this question is controversial. On the one hand, many papers still cite the work of Henry Beecher, whose 1955 paper, "The powerful placebo", effectively began the modern study of the placebo effect. Beecher claimed that placebos could "produce gross physical change," including "objective changes at the end organ which may exceed those attributable to potent pharmacological action" [1] .
On the other hand, two Danish researchers, Asbjorn Hrobjartsson and Peter Gotzsche have cast doubt on Beecher's sweeping claims [2] . Their 2001 metaanalysis of 114 trials that included both a placebo control group and a no-treatment group found that these studies fell into two distinct groups. Some had reported their results in binary terms (such as positive versus negative result) while others had used a continuous scale (such as the amount of pain relief). For the binary group, there was a small placebo effect, but the result was not significant by the normal standards of statistical research. For the studies using continuous measures, however, there was a significant beneficial placebo effect.
One problem with this study is the large range of medical problems covered by the 114 studies. In total, forty clinical conditions were examined, from asthma and smoking to menopause, marital discord and schizophrenia. Hrobjartsson and Gotzsche averaged over all these studies and, because there were relatively few studies in this sample that provided evidence in favour of the placebo effect, the negative view prevailed. But if you did the same thing for virtually any powerful drug, the result would be the same. This is because any kind of therapy that works -be it a drug, a surgical intervention, or behavioural therapy -will help people with some conditions and not others. There is no such thing as a universal remedy, a real-life cure-all, a panacea. This, at least was the upshot of their brief conclusion. In the small print, however, they were forced to concede that for some conditions, there were noticeable placebo effects. For some conditions such as anxiety the results were too variable to allow a simple interpretation. For all sorts of pain, however, there was clear positive evidence of a significant placebo effect. Headaches, postoperative pain, and sore knees could all be relieved by a sugar pill. There was, then, some reason to suspect that, in pooling the results of studies involving so many different kinds of medical condition, the true profile of the placebo response was obscured.
Rather than asking whether or not the placebo effect exists in general, therefore, we should ask which particular conditions placebos work for. Hrobjartsson and Gotzsche concede that placebos can provide effective relief from all sorts of pain. They deny that there is any good evidence that placebos work for any other symptom or condition. This conclusion does not do justice, however, to some of the studies cited. For example, two of the studies that Hrobjartsson and Gotzsche cite as providing good evidence for a placebo effect in pain relief also provide equally good evidence for a placebo effect in reducing swelling. Other studies show that stomach-ulcers, depression, and anxiety are also placebo-responsive [3] .
Placebo acupuncture and blinding
It is interesting to note that the few clinical trials that have found acupuncture to be better than a placebo all involve conditions known to be placebo-responsive. Trials of acupuncture for post-operative sickness and for easing neck and dental pain, for example, have found real acupuncture to outperform the sham version. When it comes to conditions that are not known to be placebo responsive, such as recovery from stroke and osteoarthritis, however, no difference has been found between acupuncture and placebo [4] . The most obvious explanation for this pattern is that blinding is not perfect in trials of acupuncture, allowing the placebo response to be activated more intensely by real acupuncture than by the sham version.
To refute this conclusion, acupuncture practitioners would need to ensure that future trials are properly blinded. This means that neither the participants nor those administering the treatment are able to tell whether the treatment is genuine acupuncture or not. This requires finding an appropriate placebo; a treatment that lacks the therapeutic ingredients specific to genuine acupuncture (if there are any) while resembling acupuncture in all other respects. With pharmaceuticals, it is relatively easy to make a suitable placebo, but with acupuncture things are not so straightforward. Clearly, a sugar pill would not constitute a good placebo for testing acupuncture, as patients would know immediately who was getting the placebo and who was getting the experimental treatment.
Some of the most rigorous trials of acupuncture have used, as a placebo, a 'sham' acupuncture treatment, in which needles are inserted into the skin just as in proper acupuncture, but not at the points corresponding to the meridians. However, the person who carries out the sham acupuncture is typically a trained acupuncturist, who knows where the meridians are supposed to lie. Such studies are not, therefore, double-blind, since the acupuncturist knows who is getting the experimental treatment and who is getting the placebo. The patients are likely to pick up on this, since doctors tend to give out subtle nonverbal cues that allow their patients to pick up on the doctor's degree of confidence in a treatment [5] . There is, therefore, no such thing as a single-blind study, where the doctor knows who is getting the placebo but the patient does not. As soon as the doctor knows, the patient does too -even if they might not be able to verbalize that knowledge. Trials are either double-blinded or not blinded at all.
Acupuncture trials and the Duhem-Quine problem
The choice of placebo in acupuncture trials also raises questions about the nature of the hypothesis being tested. Acupuncture as currently practiced is a complex body of theory and practice consisting of a variety of interlinked hypotheses and background assumptions. The needling technique of acupuncture, for example, is often (though not always) taught alongside the theories of traditional Chinese medicine, according to which a special kind of energy known as qi flows along channels known as meridians. If a set of trials suggests that acupuncture is no better than a placebo, then strictly speaking all that has been shown is that at least one of the hypotheses and/or background assumptions is incorrect. Yet it is never clear which hypothesis or assumption is the problem. If acupuncture is no better than sham acupuncture, for example, one possible explanation is that acupuncturists have not accurately mapped the meridians that run throughout the body. This is an instance of what philosopher's call the Duhem-Quine problem, after Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine. Stated in general terms, the idea is that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation, because an empirical test of the hypothesis requires one or more background assumptions. When the experiment does not produce the results we expect, therefore, we know that at least one of these beliefs is false, but the experiment itself does not tell us precisely which belief that is:
In sum, the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses; when the experiment is in disagreement with his predictions, what he learns is that at least one of the hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and ought to be modified; but the experiment does not designate which one should be changed [6] .
More formally, we can represent the logical structure of a scientific experiment as an argument with various premises and a conclusion. The principal hypothesis being tested constitutes one of the premises, but it is impossible to derive any significant conclusion from a single premise, so we must introduce other background assumptions:
1. Principal hypothesis 2. Background assumption #1 3. Background assumption #2 4. ….. _________________________________
Therefore: Predicted phenomenon
If we conduct the experiment and do not observe the predicted phenomenon, then we may infer by modus tollens that one of the assumptions (1, 2, 3, … ) is not correct, but we cannot deduce which assumption that is.
Sometimes, scientists may explain a negative result by rejecting one of the background assumptions rather than the principal hypothesis. To cite a classic example, when Newton's celestial mechanics failed to correctly predict the orbit of Uranus, scientists did not conclude that Newton was wrong, but instead rejected the background assumption that the solar system contained only seven planets. This turned out to be a good move, for by calculating the location of a hypothetical eighth planet influencing the orbit of Uranus, astronomers discovered Neptune.
The same strategy is in principle open to proponents of acupuncture when confronted by studies that show acupuncture to be no better than a placebo. The nature of the particular placebo used in the trial is critically important here. If, for example, the placebo consists of inserting needles into the skin just as in proper acupuncture, but not at the points corresponding to the meridians, then the logical structure of this experiment can be represented as follows:
1. Principal hypothesis: Acupuncture is a more effective remedy for back pain than a placebo 2. Background assumption #1: Acupuncture works by inserting needles into the skin. 3. Background assumption #2: The needles must be placed at particular points corresponding to the meridians. 4. Background assumption #3: Acupuncturists have mapped the meridians accurately. 5. Background assumption #4: The participants in this arm of the trial are suffering from back pain. 6 6. Background assumption #5: The participants in this arm of the trial will be treated with genuine acupuncture. 7. …. _________________________________ Therefore: The participants in this arm of the trial will experience more relief from their back pain than those in the placebo arm of the trial.
If the predicted result is not observed, it follows that at least one of the premises is false, but we do not know for sure which premise(s) we must reject. We may choose to reject the principal hypothesis, and conclude that acupuncture is no more effective for treating back pain than a placebo. But, as with the strange orbit of Uranus, we may also explain such a negative result by rejecting one of the background assumptions rather than the principal hypothesis. We may protect the principal hypothesis from refutation by, for example, rejecting premise #4 (background assumption #3) and inferring that acupuncturists have not yet accurately mapped the meridians that run throughout the body.
A similar argument applies if a different placebo is used, but the particular conclusions will be different. Take, for example, the Park Sham Device developed by Dong Bang Acuprime. When the acupuncturist presses down on one of these sham needles, it slides inside its handle, giving the appearance of penetration but without actually penetrating the skin. Doubts have been raised about whether these devices ensure proper blinding, but that is not what interests me here. The point I wish to make is that, even if blinding is perfect, a trial in which these devices are used as the placebo does not test acupuncture per se, but the background assumption (premise #2 in the argument above) that acupuncture works by inserting needles into the skin. If the participants in the experimental arm of the trial do not experience more relief from their back pain than those in the placebo arm of the trial, we may conclude that acupuncture is no more effective for treating back pain than a placebo. Alternatively, we might conclude that acupuncture works simply by placing the needles in the correct places, and actually penetrating the skin is not essential.
Duhem's own solution to the methodological problem he identified was to appeal to the "good sense" of scientists. But this optimistic proposal simply begs the question, for in the controversial cases where the Duhem-Quine problem is most pressing, scientists who draw very different conclusions are all convinced that is they who have good sense and others who lack it.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the role of placebos in clinical trials of acupuncture raises two important problems. First, the difficulty of constructing a placebo that could ensure double blinding in acupuncture trials means that when such trials show acupuncture to be more effective than the placebo, the most obvious explanation is that the placebo response to be activated more intensely by real acupuncture than by the sham version. The result is that acupuncture seems better than a placebo only when the condition being treated is, in fact, placebo responsive. This should worry acupuncture practitioners, since it suggests that acupuncture may be a pure placebo [3] .
Second, the choice of placebo will also depend on one's theory about how acupuncture is supposed to work. If this theory specifies the needles must be placed accurately at various points on various meridians, then the Park Sham Device may be appropriate, but if this theory specifies that the skin must be penetrated, then this device will not be suitable. Of course, it may be that these details have not been made sufficiently explicit by the proponents of acupuncture, in which case the debate about suitable placebos for use in acupuncture trials might provide a useful opportunity for acupuncturists to develop their theories in more detail.
Or perhaps they could abandon their theories altogether, and focus on specifying more precisely the details of the technique. This may actually be a more fruitful path, since it is the association of acupuncture with dubious theories about qi and meridians that is largely responsible for the general skepticism with which acupuncture is viewed by mainstream medicine. If the techniques of acupuncture could be separated from the dubious theories that sometimes accompany them, the way would be open to a much more profound dialogue between acupuncture and mainstream medicine.
